Rationalism, pessimism and indeterminacy are three central characteristics of Waltz's structural realism. Not surprisingly, they are also the aspects that most often come under attack by scholars aiming to either criticize or improve on Waltz's ideas. Standing out in the former group, constructivists, inspired by Alexander Wendt, advocate a minimal reading of anarchy, where the latter can engender conflict and cooperation alike, depending of what states 'make of it.' Attempts to improve on Waltz's theory, on the other hand, usually concentrate on solving the indeterminacy problem by formulating theories that should explain political outcomes more accurately while retaining most of structural realism's parsimony. The 'offensive' and 'defensive' realism schools are probably the most significant among these developments. Combining acknowledgement of the limits of neorealism with the recognition of the value and richness of this paradigm, this paper aims to reconcile the above theoretical positions (structural realism, constructivism, offensive and defensive realism) building on the work of Waltz himself. To do so we isolate Waltz's idea of 'socialization'-one of the 'transmission belts' between structure and political outcomes-and turn this concept from a constant factor into an intervening and relational variable which moves along a quantitative (high/low) as well as a qualitative (conflictual/cooperative) dimension. We then place this variable at the center of an enriched version of structural realism, where patterns of foreign policy behavior change according to the degree and type of socialization between groups of states: in the presence of high and cooperative socialization, positive perceptions and friendly behavior prevail; high and conflictual socialization, on the other hand, encourages enmity and mutually aggressive behavior; low socialization, finally, leads to higher systemic uncertainty and to cautious and defensive foreign policies. To assess the empirical validity of our theoretical claims, we conduct a brief analysis of some recent international politics situations in the light of the three behavioral categories described above.
Introduction
Kenneth Waltz's writings 1 arguably represent the most valuable (and well-known) attempt to develop a systemic theory of International Relations. As widely recognized, however, such an effort resulted in an overly parsimonious theoretical framework -a model rather than a theory 2 -whose empirical validity has been frequently challenged 3 .
On the theoretical grounds, several critiques have been raised, both by other realists and scholars belonging to different traditions. Two in particular are worth noting here: the first one objects to Waltz's statement that a good theory should not take into consideration the properties of the units 4 . This is not so much a critique to Waltz himself as an attempt to increase the explanatory power of his theory. The second line of argument questions the basic architecture of Theory of International Politics, namely the vision of a system based on structure, plus interacting units. Structure, these critics complain, is conceived only in terms of material factors (namely, power distribution) and without any reference to other, equally relevant variables such as identities, norms, or other ideational factors 5 .
Snyder and Buzan's relationship/interaction level stands in an intermediate position between the second and third level of analysis: these variables are in fact systemic, but not structural. Building on this insight, it is therefore possible to increase the explanatory power of the model without reducing the level of analysis. In other words, this kind of variables would entail "some sacrifice in parsimony", but theorists in return would "predict and explain more of the specifics of behavior and outcomes than is possible by reasoning solely from system structure and unit attributes"
11
. Admittedly, Snyder's and Buzan's contributions require deeper analysis 12 , However, they have already traced a path that, we believe, should be followed by future research attempting to update Waltz's model. Our intent is hence to preserve yet amend the neo-realist focus on third level variables. In particular, we argue that before more variables are added to the Waltzian model, more precision can be attained by developing the concept of
In what follows, we will start by recalling Waltz's argument on process
variables. Although frequently neglected in most readings (and critiques) of Theory of
International Politics, socialization and competition are important parts of the model.
We will see, however, that even Waltz's treatment of thse two variables is far from satisfactory, as he fails to contemplate the possibility that they might filter systemic pressure -eventually leading to unexpected outcomes. In part three we will elaborate on the definition of socialization and on its impact on units' action. Borrowing from a growing literature 13 , we will suggest an amendment to Waltz's model that includes socialization as a variable whose value varies along two dimensions: high/low, and positive/negative. Finally, in the fourth part we will present four cases of dyadic interstate relations in which socialization plays a role in shaping the foreign policies of the states involved.
11 Both quotes are from Snyder, Process Variables in Neorealist Theory, p. 192. 12 For a discussion of Snyder's operationalization problems, see for instance Andrea Locatelli, Lo stato dell'arte sulla teoria delle alleanze. Una riflessione sull'analisi dei rapporti inter-alleati, "Quaderni di Scienza Politica", Vol. 15, No. 2, 2008, p. 151 . 13 An excellent introduction is Kai Alderson, Making Sense of State Socialization, "Review of International Studies", Vol. 27, No. 3, 2001, pp. 415-433. 
Process variables in Waltz's theory
Waltz's discussion of socialization and competition is admittedly quite superficial 14 .
His main goal is to show that in a system's structure can affect the behavior of the units without any direct action. Apparently, he is more interested in showing the existence of systemic pressures, than in investigating the two processes. This is particularly unfortunate, since process variables happen to be an important bridge between Waltz's main independent variable (system polarity) and observed outcomes (balance of power and lack of cooperation).
Socialization is a process whose origins are to be traced to the interactions between agents. Once a group (i.e. a system) is formed, the web of interactions produced by the units spontaneously creates a context whose rules transcend the intentions and logic of the players. Borrowing the example of Edward Albee's characters, George and Martha, their actions cannot be understood just as "a set of twoway relations, because each element of behavior that contributes to the interaction is itself shaped by their being a pair"
15
. In particular, by claiming that "socialization brings member of a group into conformity with its norms" (Waltz, Theory of International Politics, , he implicitly accepts the notion that states are not just egoistic utility-maximizers, but they also follow the logic of appropriateness. For a deeper critique see Wendt, Social Theory and International Politics, ch. 3. act"
17
. What kind of order is left to the reader's interpretation. Borrowing from the economic metaphor of the market, Waltz claims only that "competition spurs the actors to accommodate their ways to the socially most acceptable and successful practices". As a result, "orderliness is in the outcomes and not necessarily in the inputs"
18
. We should then infer that being the international system a competitive arena, where incentives and penalties are placed on given actions, States will be led to act in ways that maximize their chances for survival. In other words, they will play by the rules of Realpolitik.
In sum, according to Waltz, the end result of socialization and competition is to insinuate "the fundamental norms of 'security egoism' and balance of power politics into the behavior of states"
19
. As it should be evident, therefore, process variables play a critical role in Waltz's model: they are the two main "transmission belts" 20 between structural effects and agents' behavior. What is less evident is how they work or, to put it differently, whether they can be treated as variables.
In particular, two main problems arise: first, while Waltz's use of analogies (mainly from the economic sphere) gives a broad idea of the processes, it is of little help when it comes to translating system effects into state behavior. Military Organization and Technology in South America, 1870-1914, in Frankel, Realism, pp. 193-260. 22 On learning in International Relations see among others: Jack S. Levy, Learning and Foreign Policy: Sweeping a Conceptual Minefield, "International Organization", Vol. 48, No. 2, 1994, pp. 279-312 Moreover, trends are volatile. In the late 1970s, carrying a purse was quite common for men, but then such habit became definitely uncool. The same behavior that was previously accepted as common soon became eccentric. How can we explain this radical change? Waltz's description is evidently inadequate. Although correct in claiming that through socialization units conform to the norms generated within the system, he is silent on the process that generates such norms. For these reasons a more sophisticated treatment of socialization is required.
Socialization as an intervening variable
Since the publication of Theory of International Politcs, the concept of socialization has gained considerable weight in the study of International Relations. This is mostly due to the constructivists' interest in the diffusion and effectiveness of international norms 26 .
Used in these terms, socialization is "a mechanism through which new states are induced to change their behavior by adopting those norms preferred by an international society of states"
27
. Unlike Waltz's work, this literature is mostly concerned with investigating how norms are accepted and/or forced on states. Apart from the major emphasis on the ideational factor, what is missing here is an intent to maintain the process at the systemic level. On the contrary, such an approach seems to reflect Peter Gourevitch's second image reversed, as it is more interested in the causal mechanisms that lead to the internalization of a given norm, rather than the emergence and diffusion of the norm itself. We will suggest here a tentative definition of the concept of socialization and of its implications. We will explore some of the complexities inherent in our attempt, but we will refrain from developing working hypotheses. Being our conception so different from the ones just mentioned, we believe that our first goal should be clearing the ground from conceptual confusion. In the first place, we will turn to the abovementioned contributions of Buzan and Snyder: in our attempt to treat socialization as a process variable we will maintain that socialization is a result of the interaction among states. It is therefore a systemic, but not structural variable.
We define socialization as a process involving a given number of states within the system, whose interaction refines and limits the range of foreign policy options made available by merely structural constraints.
As the reader will see, this definition is in line with Waltz's conception of socialization as a force that shapes and shoves units' behavior, but it departs from it in transmitted from one party to another […] we conceptualize it as the process through which national leaders internalize the norms and value orientations espoused by the hegemon and, as a consequence, become socialized into the community formed by the hegemon and other nations accepting its leadership position". G. John Ikenberry and Charles A. Kupchan, Socialization and Hegemonic Power, "International Organization", Vol. 44, No. 3, 1990, pp. 283-315 . 29 Although states may have a history of interaction, it may be the case that such history swings from cooperation to conflict. As we will see in the next paragraph for the USRussia dyad, where interactions do not allow to establish any clear pattern, the end result is equivalent to low socialization.
To conclude this section, a final remark is required to stress the socialization's analogy with (and distance from) Headly Bull's well known idea of "mature anarchy"
35
.
According to Bull, at any given time, states are not just part of a system, but they create a society (albeit anarchical), in which the basic rules of cohabitation are founded.
Anarchy, in this view, does not lead to the Hobbesian world portrayed by realists, but rather to a Lockeian world, where conflict and violence are (more or less effectively)
tamed. So, the more states agree on given rules, the more the system will resemble a ; so, we do not claim to be assessing the validity of our framework once and for all here, but rather to provide a first evaluation of its general plausibility in relation to the empirical reality.
Second, and related to the foregoing, this paper is a preliminary work intended as a basis for further developments of both the general typology and, especially, its empirical implications. So, in addition to being a 'plausibility check,' the empirical overview presented below serves the important inductive purposes of suggesting different directions in which the typology can be applied and, possibly, generating more precise and directly testable propositions for the future.
The above said, some basic methodological measures can still be taken to increase the significance of our analysis. will at least put power considerations (which are crucial in Waltz's theory) in the background of our picture, so allowing us to better concentrate on the relational variable 'socialization' and on its properties and effects.
The structural context we will refer to is the post-bipolar one originating from the collapse of the Soviet empire and the end of the Cold War. Within this structure, we will focus on the relations between the sole remaining global superpower -the United
States -and four of the major regional powers which, with the US, make up what Samuel Huntington has called the current 'uni-multipolar' system: the European Union, Russia, China and Iran. 38 The four resulting dyads are positioned in our typology as follows:
For each of these pairs we will summarize the type of socialization and the content of intersubjective structures at work, their origins and principal manifestations and, finally, their main consequences on the relations and interactions between the actors involved.
High and positive socialization: the US and the EU
The current pattern of socialization between the United States and the European Union has its roots in the Cold War. Socialization between the US and the Western part of the EU originates from the critical juncture of the end of WWII, when democracy was reestablished throughout the part of the continent occupied by the Allies and a network of institutions for transatlantic cooperation-most notably the NATO alliance-was created. The process of European integration itself was a direct product of that critical 38 Samuel P Huntington, The Lonely Superpower, "Foreign Affairs", Vol. 78, No. 2, 1999, pp. 35-49 . Writing ten years ago, Huntington referred to the 'German-French condominium' rather than the European Union. Given subsequent developments and for the purposes of this paper we prefer to consider the EU as a whole. In line with Huntington's argument, see also Turning to the EU as a whole, the supranational organization is not yet a full player in international politics. It acts as a unit in most trade and financial matters but less so in the military sphere. The US has often displayed an ambiguous, if not schizophrenic, attitude on the issue of European integration, usually supporting it, but sometimes also betraying anxiety about a too cohesive and independent EU, especially when it comes to military issues. 44 On the whole, however, relationships between the two polities remain mostly cooperative. This is true not only for the economic field, but also for the diplomatic one-the EU participates actively in negotiations on international issues such as the Middle East peace process and the Iranian nuclear program-and in the military one in those theaters where the EU acts autonomously.
The oft-cited division of labor between a more militarily-oriented US and a EU more active in peacekeeping and post-conflict reconstruction can be seen as an example of the 43 William Wallace, Europe, The Necessary Partner, in "Foreign Affairs", Vol. 80, No. 3, 2001, pp. 16-34. 44 C. Fred Bergsten, America and Europe: Clash of the Titans?, "Foreign Affairs", Vol. 78, No. 2, 1999, pp. 20-34. latter type of cooperation. 45 Finally, a more intense collaboration between the EU and the US has been established more recently in new security areas such as counterterrorism.
All in all the EU can hence be seen as a reliable partner of the US, a partner that for the most accepts US leadership in the liberal international order and increasingly participates in decisions affecting this system. 46 Caused to a significant extent by the high and positive kind of socialization between the two sides of the Atlantic, this continued cooperation also reinforces the existing social structures in a path dependent fashion, so orienting foreign policies even more towards mutual security and prosperity rather than rivalry.
Mixed (or low) socialization: the US and Russia
In part, the current pattern of socialization between the US and Russia dates back to the Cold War, when structural and ideological factors combined to generate a 40-year long confrontation which fitted the tenets of (neo)realism quite well, so contributing to its and to provide a basis for stable cooperation in the following years. Both sides share responsibility for this. On the one hand, the US too often took a patronizing approach to the political and economic transition of post-communist countries. This was particularly the case of the Clinton administrations, which adopted a rather unilateralist style in imposing harsh economic reforms (through the IMF) in exchange for assistance-often with the complicity of Yeltsin and his government. 48 On the other hand, partly as a reaction to what was perceived as a 'neocolonial' attitude, and partly because of a resurgence of its power (especially in the energy field), under Putin, Russia has followed more assertive foreign policies, often in open contrast with both the US and Western European countries. 49 The result of all this is a situation of mixed socialization between the US and Russia, where both countries have sent, and still send, conflicting messages that have the effect of offsetting each other and, exactly like in a situation of low socialization, prevent either side from forming a clear idea and a stable set of expectations about the other.
Two closely connected foreign policy effects follow from this relational configuration. In the first place, both states follow variable, but generally cautious foreign policies towards one another. So, while the two countries have clashed on issues such as the Kosovo and the Georgian war, NATO enlargement, the ABM treaty and the recent US missile defense plans, they find it convenient to cooperate on other important issues such as the fight against Islamic terrorism and nuclear proliferation. 50 On the whole, this is quite consistent with what one could predict from a purely structural standpoint, with Russia not necessarily adopting an aggressive stance at all times, but definitely being wary of America's hegemonic tendencies in Eurasia and ready to contrast these if necessary.
51
Second, the lack of stable reciprocal perceptions and interpretations often amplifies the direct effect of domestic variables-and of single leaders-on the foreign policy choices of both sides. The high degree of 'personalization' of US-Russian relations in the early post-Cold War era, the sometimes radical foreign policy shifts 48 Angela Stent and Lilia Shevtsova, America, Russia and Europe: A Realignment?, "Survival", Vol. 44, No. 4, 2002, pp. 121-34; Dmitri K. Simes, Losing Russia, "Foreign Affairs", Vol. 86, No. 6, 2007, p. 36 however, the relevance and stability of these benign social structures push the US-China dyad very close to the positive socialization type, so making it an overall borderline case.
The origins of the current socialization patterns between the US and China can be traced back to the 1970s rapprochement between the two countries. Partly due to the geopolitical circumstances of the Cold War, and more precisely to the Sino-Soviet rivalry, this rapprochement was greatly facilitated, form the late 70s, by the domestic reforms of Deng Xiaoping, which led to the gradual abandonment of socialism in the economic sphere and its replacement with a Western-type market system. The result of this rapprochement was an intensification of China's political and economic relations with the US (and the West in general) which is still going on, and which has generated in each side increasingly positive perceptions of the other and of its intentions and foreign policies. interdependence with the other countries in it. This makes any major attempt to subvert the status quo not credible in the eyes of its partners for the time being.
60
Second, China's cooperation with the US in the political and economic sphere is formalized in a rather dense web of institutions such as the WTO, the APEC and the ASEAN regional forum. To these one should add more recent cooperative efforts in such security areas as counterterrorism and nuclear proliferation. Finally, it must be noted how the Chinese regime's opposition to the principles of liberal democracy advocated in the West appears as more pragmatic than ideological: rather than opposing the Western idea of democracy as a fundamentally flawed concept, the Chinese leadership sees it as an objective which, however valuable, cannot be applied to their country in the short or medium run as it conflict with other objectives such as stability, sovereignty and territorial integrity.
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All this makes the US-China case a borderline one with a mixed pattern of socialization where, however, positive mutual perceptions and attitudes seem to prevail over negative ones. Needless to say, whether this trend will continue to the point of both countries seeing one another as friends rather than potential threats will depend greatly on their foreign policy choices in the years to come.
High and negative socialization: the US and Iran
That with Iran is one of the longest and most bitter stand-offs the US has ever had with any other nation. To explain this conflict, the structural variables highlighted in the Waltzian paradigm are, by themselves, insufficient. For a better understanding of the relations between the US and Iran one needs to consider the negative intersubjective structures in place between them, which lead each side to see the other in a consistently negative light and as a true enemy rather than just a potential security threat with which to deal with caution. political and economic domination that the US exercised on the country through the regime of Reza Shah Pahlavi. At the same time, the revolt was cultural and ideological, and it was directed against the secularism, materialism and corruption that from the West were penetrating Iran and the whole Middle East.
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The revolutionaries' response to these sins was the establishment of a clericdominated theocratic regime based on Islamic ideas and laws. Among the key principles inspiring this regime there were a disengagement from the bipolar logic of the Cold War-'neither with the East, nor with the West'-and a radical opposition to the United States, a 'Great Satan' with whom any negotiation or compromise was impossible and that had to be expelled from the region. The hostage crisis following the revolution was both the most spectacular expression of this hostility and a key moment in creating the image of Iran as a sworn enemy of the US. 
Conclusion
The aim of this paper is to develop an otherwise neglected aspect of Waltz's systemic model. Following the pioneering works of Glenn Snyder and Barry Buzan, we tried to increase realism's explanatory power by working on socialization as a process variable.
Our main point is that Waltz's treatment of process variables as a "transmission belt" of structural pressures failed to consider socialization as an intervening variable shaping state behavior. In our preliminary study we tried to codify the value of socialization along two dimensions: high/low, positive/negative. So, while Waltz's implicit assumption is that socialization is always negative and constant, we claim that this is only one possible scenario. As illustrated in the case of the transatlantic partnership, repeated interaction may temper the effects of anarchy, leading to behaviors that Waltz's model alone cannot easily explain. 65 Sariolghalam, Understanding Iran. 66 Mehran Kamrava, Iranian National-Security Debates: Factionalism and Lost Opportunities, "Middle East Policy", Vol. 14, No. 2, 2007, pp. 84-100. This is just an introductory step in the study of socialization. In particular, two issues need to be explored further. 
